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Abstract— The revenue maximization problem of service 
provider is considered and different pricing schemes to solve the 
above problem are implemented. The service provider can 
choose an apt pricing scheme subjected to limited resources, if he 
knows the utility function and identity of the user. The complete 
price differentiation can achieve a large revenue gain but has 
high implementation complexity. The partial price 
differentiation scheme to overcome the high implementational 
complexity of complete price differentiation scheme is also 
studied. A polynomial- time algorithm is designed for partial 
price differentiation scheme that can compute the optimal partial 
differentiation prices. The willingness of the users to pay is also 
considered while designing price differentiation schemes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pricing is an important concern for management of 
networks. It also used for design and operation of networks. 
Many sophisticated pricing mechanisms to extract surpluses 
from the consumers and maximize revenue (or profits) for the 
providers have been proposed. A typical example is the 
optimal nonlinear pricing. In practice, however, it is often 
observed simple pricing schemes being deployed by the 
service providers. Typical examples include flat-fee pricing 
and (piecewise) linear usage-based pricing. The optimal 
pricing schemes derived in economics often have a high 
implementation complexity. Besides having a higher 
maintenance cost, complex pricing schemes are not “customer 
friendly” and discourage customers from using the services. 
The task of achieving the highest possible revenue often with 
complicated pricing schemes requires knowing the 
information (identity and preference) of each customer, which 
can be challenging in large scale communication networks.  
The service provider wants to maximize its revenue by 
setting the right pricing scheme to induce desirable demands 
from users. Since the service provider has a limited total 
resource, it must guarantee that the total demand from users is 
no larger than what it can supply. The details of pricing 
schemes depend on the information structure of the service 
provider. Under complete information, since the service 
provider can distinguish different groups of users, it 
announces the pricing and the admission control decisions to 
different groups of users. 
In this paper, the optimal usage-based pricing problem in a 
resource-constrained network with one profit-maximizing 
service provider and multiple groups of surplus-maximizing 
users is studied. In wireless communication networks, 
however, the usage-based pricing scheme seems to become 
increasingly popular due to the rapid growth of wireless data 
traffic. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
The maximum revenue that can be achieved by a 
monopolistic service provider under complete network 
information has been studied in [1]. The authors proposed two 
pricing schemes with incomplete information, and showed 
that by properly combining the two schemes there would be 
very small revenue loss in a two-group case while maintaining 
the incentive compatibility. 
A model to study the important role of time-preference in 
network pricing has been presented in [2]. In the model 
presented, each user chooses his access time based on his 
preference, the congestion level, and the price that he would 
be charged. Without pricing, the "price of anarchy" (POA) can 
be arbitrarily bad. The authors then derived a 
simple pricing scheme to maximize the social welfare. From 
the SP's viewpoint, the authors considered the revenue- 
maximizing pricing strategy and its effect on the social 
welfare. The authors showed that if the SP can differentiate 
its prices over different users and times, the maximal revenue 
can be achieved, as well as the maximal social welfare. 
However, if the SP had insufficient information about the 
users and can only differentiate its prices over the access times, 
then the resulting social welfare, especially when there are 
many low-utility users, can be much less than the optimum. 
Otherwise, the difference is bounded and less significant. 
The results on price-based discrimination for bandwidth 
allocation in wire-line communication networks were 
presented in [3]. In general, the problem of mechanism design 
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for resource allocation was very complex, and the focus was 
on studying simple mechanisms that show promise of 
widespread adoption in the arena of Internet pricing. The 
objective was to study the revenue efficiency of single and 
multi-class pricing schemes as compared to the maximum 
possible revenue. 
In particular, the focus was on flat entry fees as the 
simplest pricing rule. A lower bound for the ratio between the 
revenue from this pricing rule and maximum revenue, which 
the author referred to as the Price of Simplicity was presented. 
The characterizations of types of environments that lead to a 
low Price of Simplicity was done and it was shown that the 
loss of revenue from using simple entry fees was small in a 
range of environments. 
In the communication network pricing literature, it is the 
linear pricing schemes that have been largely adopted as the 
means of controlling network usage or generating profits for 
network service providers. In [4], the authors extended the 
framework mentioned above to non-linear pricing and 
investigated optimal nonlinear pricing policy design for a 
monopolistic service provider. The problem was formulated as 
an incentive-design problem, and incentive (pricing) policies 
were obtained for a many-users regime, which enabled the 
service provider to approach arbitrarily close to Pareto-
optimal solutions. 
III. EXISTING SYSTEM 
A system model of charging, routing and flow control, 
where the system comprises both users with utility functions 
and a network with capacity constraints has been described by 
Frank Kelly[5]. Standard results from the theory of convex 
optimization show that the optimization of the system may be 
decomposed into subsidiary optimization problems, one for 
each user and one for the network, by using price per unit 
flow as a Lagrange multiplier that mediates between the 
subsidiary problems. 
TCP variants have recently been reverse-engineered to 
show that they are implicitly solving this problem, where the 
source rate vector x ≥ 0 is the only set of optimization 
variables, and the routing matrix R and link capacity vector c 
are both constants in [9]. 
maximize ∑ Us(xs) 
subject to Rx≤c 
Utility functions Us are often assumed to be smooth, 
increasing, concave, and dependent on local rate only, 
although recent investigations have removed some of these 
assumptions for applications where they are invalid. 
Flat-fee pricing: For Internet service providers, flat 
rate is access to the Internet at all hours and days of the year 
(linear rate) and for all customers of the telco operator 
(universal) at a fixed and cheap tariff. Flat rate is common 
in broadband access to the Internet in the USA and many 
other countries. 
A charge tariff is a class of linear rate where the user 
is charged on the basis of uploads and downloads (data 
transfers) and hence differs from the flat rate system. 
Some GPRS / data UMTS access to the Internet in some 
countries of Europe has no flat rate pricing, following the 
traditional "metered mentality". Because of this, users prefer 
using fixed lines (with narrow or broadband access) to 
connect to the Internet. 
IV.   PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
The partial price differentiation problem includes complete 
price differentiation scheme and single pricing scheme as 
special cases. The optimal solution to partial price 
differentiation problem is found out. The differentiation gain 
and the effective market size are the two important factors 
behind the revenue increase of price differentiation schemes. 
A network with a total amount of S limited resource is 
considered. The resource can be in the form of rate, bandwidth, 
power, time slot, etc. The monopolistic service provider 
allocates the resource to a set I = {1, . . . , I} of user groups [8]. 
Each group i ∈ I has Ni homogeneous users with the same 
utility function: 
ui (si) = ϴi ln(1 + si) 
Where si is the allocated resource to one user in group i and ϴi 
represents the willingness to pay of group i. 
       It is assumed that ϴ1>ϴ2> …. >ϴI. Since the service 
provider has a limited total resource, it must guarantee that the 
total demand from users is no larger than what it can supply. 
The details of pricing schemes depend on the information 
structure of the service provider. 
       The correspondence between the service provider and 
user can be described as follows: 
 
Fig. 1. General Proposed Model 
       The service provider declares the pricing schemes in 
Stage 1 and users interact with their demands in Stage 2. The 
users demand to maximize their surplus by optimizing their 
claim according to the pricing scheme. The service provider 
maximizes his revenue by making available a right pricing 
scheme to users. 
       It is considered that the service provider has the complete 
information of the user. The service provider can choose from 
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complete price differentiation scheme, the single pricing 
scheme, and the partial price differentiation scheme. 
A. Complete Price Differentiation 
The service provider knows the utility and the identity of 
each user; it is possible to maximize the revenue by charging a 
different price to each group of users. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Complete Price Differentiation 
 
Algorithm: 
Step 1: Solve users’ maximization problem which leads to 
unique optimal demand. 
Step 2: In stage 1, the service provider maximizes his revenue 
by choosing a price Pi and number of users ‘n’ for each group 
I, subject to total resource ‘S’. 
Step 3: Perform Complete Price Differentiation scheme by 
charging each group by different price. 
B. Single Pricing 
In this scheme, the service provider charges a single price 
to all groups of users. This scheme may suffer a considerable 
revenue loss. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Single Pricing 
 
Algorithm: 
Step 1: Single pricing follows the same approach as complete 
pricing scheme. A solution is obtained which shares a similar 
structure as complete price differentiation. 
Step 2: There exists an optimal solution of this scheme that 
satisfies following conditions: 
 All users are admitted: n*I = Ni  for all i ∈I[8]. 
 There exists a price p* and a group index threshold 
Ksp≤ I such that only the top Ksp groups of users 
receive positive resource allocations [8]. 
 
C. Partial Price Differentiation 
The service provider offers only a few pricing plans for the 
entire users population; it is termed as the partial price 
differentiation scheme. The clusters are defined. Each cluster 
is a set of groups which have been charged same price. The 
partial price differentiation problem is solved in three levels. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Partial Price Differentiation 
 
Algorithm: 
Step 1: Pricing and resource allocation in each cluster: For a 
fix partition α and a cluster resource allocation, focus on 
pricing and resource allocation problem within each cluster. 
Step 2: Resource allocation among clusters: For a fix partition 
α allocate resources among clusters. 
Step 3: Cluster Partition: Cluster partition problem is solved. 
 
V. MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
A. Complete Price Differentiation 
This method can be carried out in two stages as given 
below: 
1) User’s Surplus Maximization Problem:  
If a user in group i has been admitted into the network and 
offered a linear price pi , then it solves the following surplus 
maximization problem [8],  
Maximize         ui (si) – pi si 
si ≥0 
 
2) Service Provider’s Pricing and Admission Control 
Problem: 
CP: maximize  ∑ni pi si 
       p≥0,s≥0,n      i∈ G 
subject to si = ( ϴi / pi - 1 ) +, i ∈ G, 
ni ∈ {0, . . . , Ni } , i ∈ G, 
∑ni si  ≤ S 
i∈G 
B. Single Pricing 
This problem can be formulated as given below [8]: 
SP:  maximize p  ∑ni si 
              p≥0, n  i∈G 
subject to si = ( ϴi / pi - 1 ) +, i ∈ G, 
ni ∈ {0, . . . , Ni } , i ∈ G, 
∑ni si  ≤ S 
i∈G 
  
Here the service provider charges a single price p to all groups 
of users. 
 
               International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT) – Volume 9 Number 2 - Mar  2014 
 
            ISSN: 2231-5381                    http://www.ijettjournal.org                               Page 72 
 
C. Partial Price Differentiation 
The Partial Price differentiation (PP) problem is formulated as 
follows [8]. 
PP: maximize   ∑ni pi si 
ni, pi, si,pj , ai j            i∈G 
subject to si = ( ϴi / pi - 1 ) +, ∀i ∈ G, 
ni ∈ {0, . . . , Ni } , ∀i ∈ G, 
∑ni si  ≤ S 
 i∈G 
  
The service provider can choose the price charged to each 
group. 
VI. ANALYSIS MODEL 
The system consists of two modules as shown in  Fig. 5. 
• User Module 
The User has to register first and only then he can use the 
product. 
• Service Provider Module 
Service Provider selects a pricing scheme to maximize his 
revenue. 
 
 
Fig. 5 System Architecture 
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Fig. 6 System Analysis Model 
 
VII. APPLICATIONS 
 The Omaha based Network Pricing, Mitec, has a 
variety of pricing options that target personal, 
business and corporate users. They offer Web 
development solutions and a variety of different 
access speeds. For users seeking "personal 
solutions," for example, Mitec offers them an option 
of a flat-fee account with unlimited access for $19.95 
(flat-fees also help in gaining market share), or a 
tiered account with a flat-fee of $9.95 for the first 20 
hours and a $1 additional charge for each hour 
thereafter. For the family on the Internet, Mitec offers 
unlimited access for $24.95 with five separate email 
accounts. 
 AT&T shifted to usage-based wireless data plans in 
June 2010 [6]. AT&T announced two new wireless 
data plans based on the amount of data subscribers 
use. The change spelled the end of unlimited wireless 
data use for new customers and likely higher charges 
for existing customers who use more than 2GB of 
data per month for activities such as watching videos 
and online gaming. 
 Verizon followed up with similar plans (like AT&T) 
in July 2011. Similar usage-based pricing plans have 
been adopted by major Chinese wireless service 
providers including China Mobile and China 
UniCom. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The revenue-maximizing problem for a monopoly service 
provider under complete network information is studied. The 
focus is to investigate the trade-off between the total revenue 
and the implementational complexity (measured in the 
number of pricing choices available for users) under complete 
information. The partial price differentiation is the most 
general one among the three pricing differentiation schemes 
that have been proposed (i.e., complete, single, and partial), 
and includes the other two as special cases. An algorithm that 
computes the optimal partial pricing scheme in polynomial 
time, and numerically quantizes the trade-off between 
implementational complexity and total revenue has been 
designed. 
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